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CONFUSING SIMILARITY IN TRADEMARKS:
A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The vagueness of the Lanham Act' and the courts'2 peculiar
habits of decision in trademark cases have produced a plethora of
inconsistent decisions.3 Section 1051(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, the only
statutory criterion for determining whether one trademark infringes
another, provides simply that no trademark may be registered that so
resembles an unabandoned trademark registered or used in the United
States "as to be likely ... to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive." 4 Courts consistently shun precedent in deciding whether
two trademarks are confusingly similar,5 maintaining that each case
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72, 1091-96, 1111-21, 1123-27 (1964). Courts gave legal effect to
trademarks even before the enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946. E.g., Mishawaka Rub-
ber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, rehearing denied, 316 US. 712
(1942).
Legal remedies against trademark infringement are based on two rationales: first,
protection of the prior user's good will against unfair competition (Franchised Stores of
N.Y., Inc. v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1968); Eureka Williams Corp. v. McCorquodale,
205 F.2d 155 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 872 (1953); Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Marzall,
94 F. Supp. 254 (D.D.C. 1950), aff'd, 196 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Mont-O-Min Sales
Corp. v. Wyeth Inc., 92 F. Supp. 150 (D. Mo. 1950)); and second, protection of the con-
sumer (Franchised Stores of N.Y., Inc. v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1968); W.E. Bassett
Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 354 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1966); Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Marzall, 94 F.
Supp. 254 (DD.C. 1950), aff'd, 196 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Mont-O-Min Sales Corp. v.
Wyeth Inc., 92 F. Supp. 150 (D. Mo. 1950); S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 8 F.R.D. 217
(W.D.N.Y. 1948), aff"d, 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949)).
2 "Courts" as used in this note refers to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(T.T.A.B.) and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) as well as the other
federal courts.
3 E.g., compare In re William Intner Co., Inc., 155 U.S.P.Q. 101 (T.TA.B. 1967)
(mattress and bed spring producer's mark, HEIRLOOM, held not confusingly similar to
HEIRLOOM QUALITY, the mark of a producer of household furniture), with In re
Scovill Mfg. Co., 154 U.S.P.Q. 322 (T.T.A.B. 1967) (GOURMET CENTER for an electric-
powered unit held confusingly similar to GOURMET for electric plate cosies and bun
warmers); and In re Signal Oil & Gas Co., 154 U.S.P.Q. 123 (T.T.A.B. 1967) (HANCOCK
500 for gasoline allowed registration in spite of HANCOCK for petroleum products), with
In re Standard Kollsman Industries, Inc., 156 U.S.P.Q. 346 (T.T.A.B. 1967) (SKI for
television and radio tuners not allowed registration where there was prior use of SK-97,
SK-128, SK-98, and SK-58, all for high fidelity speakers for radios and phonographs); and
In re Colgate-Palmolive Co., 154 U.S.P.Q. 255 (I.T.A.B. 1967) (SOFTERGENT for heavy
duty detergent allowed registration despite prior use of SYNTERGENT for similar
product), with American Mfg. Co. v. Heald Machine Co., 385 F.2d 456 (C.C.P.A. 1967)
(BORMASTER for cross slide assemblies not allowed registration due to prior use of
BORE-MATIC for machines used for the precision finishing of holes or bores in metal).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (1964). See also id. § 1052(d).
5 "[P]rior decisions in trademark cases, where the issue is a likelihood of confusion,
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must be decided on its own facts.6 The lack of consistency engendered
by this approach is compounded by the courts' attention to the pos-
sibility of confusion rather than its actuality.7 Although actual con-
fusion seems in many cases to be adequate evidence of the likelihood
of confusion, the courts give minimal weight to testimony concerning
actual confusion.8 Similarity of marks is considered largely a matter
of opinion,9 and a court's opinion is controlling.10
Inconsistent decisions result because the courts attempt to decide
what the public will find confusing while minimizing their contacts
with the public, and because there are no objective standards to guide
the courts. Amending the Lanham Act to make use of consumer sur-
veys and a precise objective standard would alleviate many of the
problems in trademark litigation.
furnish meager assistance in the resolution of that issue." Polaroid Corp. v. Richard Mfg.
Co., 341 F.2d 150, 152 (C.C.P.A. 1965); accord, Magnaflux Corp. v. Sonoflux Corp., 231
F.2d 669 (C.C.P.A. 1956); Holiday Casuals v. M. Beckerman & Sons, 228 F.2d 224 (C.C.P.A.
1955).
6 "It has been observed too often to require citation of authority that the question
of likelihood of confusion is one which must be determined on the facts of each particular
case." Stonecutter Mills Corp. v. Universal Overall Co., 379 F.2d 979, 982 (C.C.P.A. 1967);
accord, In re Meyer & Wenthe, Inc., 267 F.2d 945 (C.C.P.A. 1959); Kiekhaefer Corp. v.
Willy-Overland Motors, Inc., 236 F.2d 423 (C.C.P.A. 1956); Kenosha Full Fashioned Mills
v. Artcraft Hosiery Co., 161 F.2d 751 (C.C.P.A. 1947).
7 "The absence of actual confusion ... is not a controlling factor ... for the reason
that the statute prohibits the registration of a mark that is 'likely' to cause confusion."
Celanese Corp. v. EJ. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 154 F.2d 146, 147 (C.C.P.A. 1946);
accord, Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Clevite Corp., 324 F.2d 1010 (C.C.P.A. 1963); S.C.
Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 266 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 861 U.S. 820 (1959);
Salem Commodities, Inc. v. Miami Margarine Co., 244 F.2d 729 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
8 See Quaker Oats Co. v. St. Joe Processing Co., 232 F.2d 653 (C.C.P.A. 1956). The
court held that witnesses' opinions as to the likelihood of confusion amounted to nothing
more than expressions of opinion. Furthermore, the court stated that if such testimony
were adopted, the effect would be to substitute witnesses' opinions for the court's opinion
and that this would be improper.
9 Squirt Co. v. Pola-Rona Inc., 229 F.2d 463 (C.C.P.A. 1956). See also May Dep't Stores
Co. v. Schloss Bros. & Co., 234 F.2d 879 (C.C.P.A. 1956); Intercontinental Mfg. Co. v. Conti-
nental Motors Corp., 230 F.2d 621 (C.C.P.A. 1956); Princess Pat, Ltd. v. Tursi, 230 F.2d 440
(C.C.P.A. 1956).
10 Warner Bros. Co. v. Jantzen Inc., 150 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 249 F.2d
853 (2d Cir. 1957).
The statute provides:
In every case of interference, opposition to registration, application to .register
as a lawful concurrent user, or application to cancel the registration of a mark,
the Commissioner... shall direct a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to deter-
mine and decide the respective rights of registration.
15 US.C. § 1067 (1964). All subsequent litigation in the courts is on appeal; as a result, a
jury trial is never had.-
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I
RELIABILITY IN CONSUMER SURVEYS
Perhaps the best way to decide whether two trademarks are con-
fusingly similar is to ask the public; yet courts are reluctant to utilize
consumer surveys." Perhaps this judicial attitude exists in part be-
cause courts look with disfavor upon any threatened incursion into
their decision-making power. But the courts are also justifiably con-
cerned with the lack of objectivity in the consumer surveys offered
in infringement cases. 12 Surveys prepared by one side tend to be prej-
udicially constructed or administered.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Insurance Co.,13 the
prior user, Sears, claimed that the use of ALL STATES LIFE IN-
SURANCE CO. infringed its ALLSTATE trademark for auto insur-
ance and auto accessories. The court gave no weight to a survey under-
taken by Sears, because questions to interviewees about ALLSTATE
and ALLSTATE INSURANCE preceded questions about the owner-
ship of ALL STATES LIFE INSURANCE CO.; ALLSTATE was
brought to mind before the interviewees were questioned as to the
ownership of ALL STATES LIFE INSURANCE CO. Another court
gave no weight to a survey that asked interviewees whether it had
occurred to them that UP-TOWN and 7-UP might be produced by
the same company.14 Since the survey itself associated the two marks
by referring to both in the same question, it was held that the results
did not indicate confusion in the mind of the typical consumer.
A third court denied evidentiary weight to a survey conducted
by a prior user because of the technique of selecting interviewees. A
letter had been sent to a group familiar with the prior user's product;
CLOUD mattresses, asking who manufactured CELLACLOUD mat-
tresses; there was nothing to suggest that there would have been
11 At one time consumer surveys were considered inadmissible hearsay, but it is now
well established that they are admissible. The statements of the persons interviewed are
said to be offered to show the interviewees' states of mind rather than the truth of what
they assert. Eg., International Milling Co. v. Robin Hood Popcorn Co., Inc., 110 U.S.P.Q.
368 (Comm'r 1956). It has also been maintained that no question of hearsay is involved;
the persons who conduct the survey usually will testify only as to the results of the survey,
not as to its sources, and therefore the only problem is the credibility of the witness who
is before the court. E.g., United States v. 88 Cases, More or Less, 187 F.2d 967 (Sd Cir.
1951): 
12 See Brufsky, Effect of Confusion Surveys in Trademark Litigation, 11 IDEA 7 (1967).
18 246 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1957).
14 Seven-Up Co. v. Feigenson Bros. Co., 128 U.S.P.Q. 89 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
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confusion if the new product had been encountered in the market
place.15
In Coca-Cola Co. v. Victor Syrup Corp.10 the court rejected a
consumer survey conducted by the prior user because of intrinsic
ambiguity. Two investigators went to two hundred establishments
that sold soft drinks. One investigator asked for NUTRI-COLA while
the other asked for COCA-COLA. The prior user maintained that,
since one half of the establishments made no distinction and served
both investigators from the same tap, confusion existed. The court
pointed out that there was no way of knowing whether the persons
serving the drinks were confused or made the substitution deliber-
ately.
Occasionally courts give little or no weight to consumer surveys
for articulated reasons that are at best rationalizations. In General
Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine & Boat Co.,'7 CADILLAC for boats
iwas claimed to infringe CADILLAC for automobiles. The court gave
no weight to a consumer survey because the individuals questioned
were not actual purchasers of the products involved; in so doing it
disregarded the need to protect the potential consumer as well as the
old customer. In another case in which a consumer survey was re-
jected,18 the crucial question in the survey concerned confusion as
to the sponsoring of a product. The court based its decision totally
on semantics, stating that the issue was whether there was confusion,
not as to who sponsored the product, but as to its origin. The real
issue-the validity of the survey-was never reached. In yet another
case, Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Frolich,'9 the court gave only limited
weight to a consumer survey, maintaining that trademark litigation
did not consist of a word association game, but rather involved a
balancing of the competing goals of preventing confusion and allow-
ing unfettered use of the English language, the latter giving way to
the former when the court decides there is likelihood of confusion.
The cases suggest that certain conditions are essential if a con-
sumer survey is to be reliable. A skilled and impartial expert should
prepare and administer the survey to randomly selected, impartial
persons. The group polled should be a cross-section of potential pur-
chasers of the product involved. It should be varied as to sex, age,
15 Huntington Natl Mattress Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 127 U.S.P.Q. 428
(T.TA.B. 1960), modified, 128 US.P.Q. 99 (T.T.A.B. 1961).
18 97 U.S.P.Q. 478 (Comm'r 1953), aff'd, 218 F.2d 596 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
17 226 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mich. 1964).
18 Lever Bros. Co. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 111 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
19 195 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 296 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1961).
1970]
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educational background, and economic status, to the extent that such
factors do not distinguish consumers from non-consumers. 20 The
survey questions must be formulated so as not to prejudice the re-
sponse. Reference to the prior user's mark should not be permitted,
for an immediate association would inevitably follow. An overly
cooperative interviewee's prejudice may be countered by asking the
question concerning the alleged infringing trademark within a series
of questions about other trademarks. 21
Because there is no assurance that these suggested guidelines can
be adhered to in a survey prepared or commissioned by one of the
parties to infringement litigation, 22 independently conducted surveys
should be used. There are several methods by which surveys by dis-
interested parties could be implemented. When the issue of confusing
similarity arises, the court could commission someone to conduct
the survey, or the parties might stipulate a survey-taker. Alternatively,
a consumer-survey section of the Federal Trade Commission could
be established to formulate statistically sound survey questions and
to present these questions to a statistically sound sample group.
II
AN OBJECTrVE STANDARD
Regardless of the method used for implementing a survey, the
crucial factor is the percentage of people indicating confusion with
respect to either the product or its origin. Congress should establish a
percentage standard to determine whether there is sufficient likelihood
of confusion under the Lanham Act. A survey showing confusion in
excess of that percentage should be conclusive evidence of infringe-
ment, and a survey showing confusion less than that percentage should
be conclusive evidence 'of no infringement, for there is a need to take
the fact question of public confusion out of the realm of judicial spec-
ulation and intuition. If the survey is not deemed conclusive, courts will
still decide what people en masse find confusing.
If the survey is to be conclusive upon the courts, arguably the
20 Brufsky, supra note 12, at 18. The author shows these requirements to be typical
of surveys to which courts have given substantial weight and absent from surveys to
which courts have given minimal weight.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 161, 172 (5th
Cir. 1957); National Biscuit Co. v. Princeton Mining Co., Inc., 137 U.S.P.Q. 250 (T.T.A.B.
1963), aff'd, 338 F.2d 1022 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
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court system should be bypassed entirely. This, however, should not be
done. Whether trademarks are confusingly similar is often just one
legal issue among many in an infringement case. Although the issue
of confusing similarity might be conclusively settled, the final deter-
mination in the case might turn on totally different principles.23
It may be arbitrary to declare that an exact percentage of con-
fusion among those surveyed is proof of "confusion" under the Lanham
Act.24 But what arbitrariness there is lies in the treatment given the
borderline case, and this criticism may be leveled at any precise stan-
dard. The present system is also arbitrary, and in a worse way; a judge
is able to declare two trademarks confusingly similar without reference
to any objective standard. An exact percentage standard clearly sep-
arates trademark cases into two groups. While it may yield the wrong
decision in an isolated case, it is necessary if judicial arbitrariness is to
be precluded.
An exact percentage test may also yield results apparently as in-
consistent as those reached under the present system. The results will
not be truly inconsistent, however, and that they should seem so only
illustrates the difficulties of the present system. A survey system will
statistically determine what a particular segment of the market does or
does not find confusing. If the results seem inconsistent to an individual
observer, it is because an individual cannot determine what the public
will find confusing. Indeed, it is because the reactions of individuals
are different from the reaction of the public that a survey system is
needed.
CONCLUSION
Determination of consumer confusion is by its very nature not an
adjudicative function. The rationalistic, deductive approach typical of
the law is'inappropriate when the fact to be determined is not in the
past but in the present and future.2 5 Whether confusion exists is a ques-
23 For example, defendant may claim (1) that the two trademarks are not con-
fusingly similar and (2) that the prior user abandoned the use of his trademark. If the
survey showed no consumer confusion, it would decide the case. However, if the survey
showed the existence of confusion, the outcome of the case would depend on a judicial
determination of abandonment.
24 Arguably, this approach is no more arbitrary and no more vulnerable to attack
than the precise dollar distinction between petty and grand larceny. In both cases there
is a dear cut-off point with severe legal consequences.
25 See Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EvmENcE AND
INPERENcE 48 (D. Lerner ed. 1958):
The adjudicative facts of interest to the law, being historical facts, will rarely be
19701
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tion of present and future fact; the concern is not with whether A
killed B two years ago, but rather with whether two trademarks are
confusingly similar today and will be so tomorrow. Here the inductive
methods of empirical science, as employed in the modem consumer
survey conducted by an impartial taker, are both available and prefer-
able.
Charles Matays
triable by the experimental methods of the natural sciences.... For the most part
the law must settle disputed questions of adjudicative fact by reliance upon the
ambiguous implications of non-fungible "traces"--traces on human brains and
on pieces of paper and traces in the form of unique arrangements of physical
objects.
Id. at 52.
